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This paper uses a dynamic optimization model to estimate the welfare gains of hedging against commodity
price risk for commodity-exporting countries. We show that the introduction of hedging instruments
such as futures and options enhances domestic welfare through two channels. First, by reducing export
income volatility and allowing for a smoother consumption path. Second, by reducing the country's
need to hold foreign assets as precautionary savings (or by improving the country's ability to borrow
against future export income). Under plausibly calibrated parameters, the second channel may lead
to much larger welfare gains, amounting to several percentage points of annual consumption.
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Commodity exporters can insure against the risk in export income by accumulating foreign assets
in commodity stabilization funds, or by hedging with derivative instruments. The rst strategy has
costs, but reliance on markets for hedging instruments remains limited in spite of the development
of those markets in the last two decades. What is the trade-o between precautionary savings and
hedging? How is this trade-o aected by the development of markets for hedging instruments?
What is the potential welfare gains from further developing those markets?
This paper provides an integrated and welfare-based analysis of those questions based on a
dynamic stochastic optimization model. We consider a small open economy with a representative
agent that is exposed to risk in the price of the country's commodity exports. The country can
insure against this risk by accumulating foreign assets (precautionary savings) or by using hedging
instruments that are available at a limited horizon. We characterize the optimal accumulation of
foreign assets and hedging policies, and then calibrate the model by reference to data on oil and
other key commodities. We measure the welfare gains from using futures and options, and from
expanding the horizon of those instruments.
The introduction of hedging instruments enhances domestic welfare through two channels. The
rst channel, of course, involves income smoothing: reduced income volatility leads to lower con-
sumption volatility and higher welfare if the representative consumer is averse to risk. The welfare
gain from this channel should be of the same order of magnitude as the welfare cost of the business
cycle, and indeed, we nd that it is not very large (although it is larger for developing countries than
for advanced economies). For the typical commodity exporter the welfare gain from full insurance
coming through this channel amounts to 0.4 percent of annual consumption.
The second channel involves the \external balance sheet" of the economy, i.e., how the country
changes its external assets and liabilities when hedging instruments are available. Hedging reduces
the need to hold foreign assets as precautionary savings against risk in export income. In addition,
hedging allows the country to issue more default-free external debt by reducing the downside risk
in export income. We nd that the balance sheet channel may yield much larger welfare gains
than the income smoothing channel|possibly amounting to several percentage points of annual
consumption. The welfare gain from extending the horizon of hedging may also be important,
2especially if the uctuations in the price of the commodity are persistent.
We use sensitivity analysis and extensions of the model to better understand the conditions
underlying our results. First, a key parameter is the country's \impatience" or willingness to
borrow abroad (which is determined by domestic preferences, the growth rate, and the world
interest rate). The welfare gains from hedging are large for countries that are impatient and
those gains come mainly from the relaxation of the external borrowing constraint. For the other
(\patient") countries the welfare cost of maintaining large amounts of precautionary foreign assets
is smaller, and so is the benet of hedging instruments. Second, for the impatient countries most of
the welfare gains occur in the rst decade following the introduction of new hedging instruments.
In the long run domestic consumption is reduced by the service of the debt accumulated in the rst
decade. Finally, a fraction of the insurance provided by hedging can also be obtained by making
external debt defaultable contingent on a low commodity price (although default costs are likely
to make this an inecient form of insurance relative to hedging). These caveats complement but
do not detract from one basic message of this paper: the welfare gains from hedging come not
only from income smoothing but also from improving the country's ability to manage its external
balance sheet.
This paper belongs in the literature that applies a precautionary savings framework to analyze
a small open economy's optimal accumulation of foreign assets (Atish R. Ghosh and Jonathan D.
Ostry (1997); Ceyhun Bora Durdu, Enrique G. Mendoza and Marco E. Terrones (2009)). More
specically, it belongs in the part of this literature that focuses on risk coming from shocks in
the output or price of a commodity export. For example, Patricio Arrau and Stijn Claessens
(1992) apply Angus Deaton (1991) model of precautionary savings to derive the optimal rules for a
commodity stabilization fund. Rudolfs Bems and Irineu de Carvalho Filho (2009) calibrate a small
open economy model to quantify the role of precautionary savings in economies with exhaustible
resources.1
The main innovation of this paper is to consider precautionary savings jointly with instruments
to hedge the commodity price risk. This allows us to estimate the welfare gains from commodity
price hedging when precautionary savings provides a realistic alternative. This paper is the rst,
1See also Eduardo Engel and Rodrigo Vald es (2000) and our companion paper Olivier Jeanne and Damiano Sandri
(2009).
3to our knowledge, to provide such estimates in a stochastic dynamic optimization model of a
commodity-exporting country. Ricardo J. Caballero and Stavros Panageas (2008) show, in the
context of a dynamic general equilibrium model, how optimal hedging strategies can help a country
to save on precautionary savings against sudden stops in capital ows.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts about commodity
exports as a source of volatility and about reliance on hedging instruments. Section 3 presents the
model. Section 4 presents our calibration of the model as well as our estimates of the welfare gains
from hedging. Section 5 presents two extensions of the basic framework and section 6 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
A substantial number of developing countries heavily depend on the export of one single commodity.
This is especially true for Petroleum, which is by far the most internationally traded commodity,
but also for Copper, Gold and Natural Gas. Table 1 lists those countries with an average ratio
of commodity net export (X) to non-commodity GDP (Y ) between 2002 and 2007 of at least 10
percent.2 We identify more than 40 cases, with ratios that in the case of Petroleum often exceed
30 percent and exceed 80 percent for Saudi Arabia.
This heavy dependence on commodity exports can cause substantial undesirable volatility in
the economy. Table 2 shows that the standard deviation of commodity export income, ( ~ X), tends
to be more than twice as large as that of non-commodity income, (~ Y ).3
The governments and private agents of commodity exporting countries have developed various
ways of insuring themselves against commodity price risk. First, many governments have accu-
mulated a buer stock of assets in commodity-stabilization funds. To some extent, the saving is
intended to deal with predictable exhaustion of the commodity resources, but it is also meant as
precautionary savings against uncertainty in domestic output or in the price. There are, however,
potential drawbacks to this strategy. For example, those funds may be misused because of weak
2Commodity export data are from UN COMTRADE retrieved though World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). We
use the IMF Commodity Unit product aggregates based on the SITC3 classication. GDP data are from the World
Bank World Development Indicators database. We consider countries with at least 3 data points over 2002-2007.
3Standard deviations are computed with data from the countries listed in Table 1, starting from the rst year at which
X=Y > 5 percent. The table reports the standard deviations of the log of commodity export and non-commodity
income detrended with a time trend. The standard deviations by commodities are obtained as the simple average of
country volatilities.
4Table 1: Countries with 2002-2007 average of commodity net export share of non-commodity-GDP
above 10 percent





Guinea 15.6 Kuwait 73.2
Jamaica 11.2 Gabon 63.8
Cocoa
Cote d'Ivoire 16.6 Oman 63.2
Ghana 10.7 Brunei 55.8
Copper
Zambia 23.4 United Arab Emirates 54.1
Mongolia 19.1 Nigeria 48.2
Chile 19.0 Qatar 40.9
Papua New Guinea 11.4 Venezuela 37.9
Fish
Iceland 10.4 Azerbaijan 36.6
Maldives 10.3 Bahrain 34.8
Gold
Mali 17.7 Algeria 33.4
Papua New Guinea 14.5 Kazakhstan 33.3
Guyana 14.0 Yemen 30.6
Kyrgyz Republic 11.0 Iran, Islamic Rep. 25.4
Mongolia 10.7 Norway 17.6
Iron Mauritania 22.2 Russian Federation 14.7
Natural
Gas
Brunei 29.2 Syrian Arab Republic 14.3
Qatar 26.5 Ecuador 13.0
Trinidad and Tobago 20.1 Trinidad and Tobago 12.7
Algeria 17.5 Sudan 12.1
Bolivia 13.5 Sugar Guyana 18.2
governance leading to diversion for purposes other than insurance, or unsustainable management,
like trying to oset a permanent shock. Furthermore, the accumulation of precautionary reserves
comes at the cost of reducing consumption and welfare.
Insurance against price risk can also be achieved by the use of hedging instruments, whose
welfare implications are studied in this paper. The market participants are typically large, but
small agents can benet indirectly, through their governments or nancial intermediaries. Although
these markets have developed signicantly in recent years, economists have for some time wondered
why they still remain so incomplete (short horizon), and why the existing instruments are not used
to a larger extent (see, e.g., Ricardo J. Caballero and Kevin N. Cowan (2007), Torbjorn Becker,
Olivier Jeanne, Paolo Mauro and Romain Ranci ere (2007) and Andrew Powell (1989)). Figure 1
5Table 2: Standard deviation of the detrended log of commodity exports ( ~ X) and non-commodity
GDP (~ Y )
Commodity ( ~ X) (~ Y ) ( ~ X)=(~ Y )
Aluminum 0.18 0.09 2.0
Cocoa 0.30 0.18 1.6
Copper 0.38 0.17 2.3
Fish 0.20 0.11 1.8
Gold 0.32 0.11 3.0
Iron 0.16 0.08 2.0
Natural Gas 0.21 0.12 1.7
Petroleum 0.34 0.16 2.2
Sugar 0.18 0.09 1.9
shows the average open interest position and risk premium on oil futures in the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) market between 2003 and 2009.4 We see that most of the hedging is limited to
maturities of less than three months as the risk premium becomes very large for longer maturities.5
Furthermore, the total open interest position in futures on the two largest markets for oil, the
NYMEX and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), is currently around only 2.3 billions of barrels
which is less than thirty days of world production and less than six weeks of world export.6 The
limited extent of hedging is even more striking if compared with the size of proven oil reserves:
the combined NYMEX and ICE open interest position is indeed less than 0:2 percent of known oil
reserves.7
4The risk premium is computed as the average ex-post forecast error over the sample period.
5Lower risk premia are generally found using a longer time sample (Patrizio Pagano and Massimiliano Pisani (2009)).
Over the last ve years oil prices have been mostly rising and therefore part of the gap between spot and futures prices
can be due to a peso eect. Note that the limited availability of long-term contracts does not preclude long-term
hedging, which can be partially achieved by rolling forward short-maturity contracts.
6Similar sizes of open interest position in futures relative to world production are also reported in the IMF World
Economic Outlook (2007, April) for natural gas, copper, corn, and soybeans.
7We underestimate the extent of hedging by leaving aside over-the-counter transactions (Patrick Campbell, Bjorn-
Erik Orskaug and Richard Williams (2006)). However, open interest positions overestimate hedging by including
contracts underwritten by speculators without a direct exposure to oil prices. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission reports that around 30 percent of the open interest positions on the NYMEX are held by speculators,








Hedging is still limited
Total open interest on NYMEX and ICE is currently around 2.3b barrels
less than 30 days of world production and 6 weeks of world export
less than 0.2% of the known reserves
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Figure 1: Average open interest and risk premium (NYMEX July 03 - May 09)
3 The model
The framework is an extension of the model of Jeanne and Sandri (2009) that incorporates hedging
instruments. We consider a small open economy that is exposed to shocks in the price of the
commodity that it exports. We rst present the assumptions of the model with precautionary
savings but no hedging (section 3.1) and then introduce futures into the model (section 3.2).
3.1 No hedging
We consider a small open economy producing an exportable good (the commodity) and populated
by a representative innitely-lived consumer. The consumer derives utility from consuming another
good that we will call the consumption good. The consumption good will be used as numeraire.









subject to the budget constraint
Bt+1
1 + r
+ Ct = Bt + Yt + Xt; (2)
7where Bt is the consumer's holding of foreign assets at the beginning of period t, r is the risk-free
world interest factor, Yt is the domestic output of consumption good (non-commodity GDP), and
Xt is the level of commodity production (and exports) expressed in terms of consumption good.
In order to better focus on the consequences of uncertain export income, we assume that the
domestic output of consumption good is deterministic, and grows by a factor G in every period.
Thus, the budget constraint can be rewritten in units of non-exportable income as
bt+1 =




(1 + xt + bt   ct) (3)
where lower-case variables are normalized by Yt, for example bt = Bt=Yt.
The stochastic dynamics of the economy are driven by the normalized export income, xt. Since
we are interested primarily in the insurance of the price risk, we abstract from the quantity risk and
assume that the country exports a constant normalized volume q of commodity. Without hedging,
thus, one has
xt = qpt;
where pt is the spot price of the commodity. We assume that the spot price follows a multiplicative
error process:
pt+1 = (p + (pt   p))"t+1; (4)
where p without time subscript is the average price,   1 is the persistence of the price process,
and "t is an i.i.d. positive random variable of mean one.8
We assume that the domestic consumer can borrow only against future export income and we
rule out the possibility of default.9 Therefore, to ensure solvency the debt level can never be larger
than the minimum present discounted value of future export income. More formally the country is











8We do not use an AR1 in levels to rule out negative prices. We also prefer to avoid working with an AR1 in logs,
which complicates the computation of conditional expectations and the pricing of futures contracts.
9We allow for default in section 5.2 in order to assess its potential as an alternative insurance mechanism.
8where the minimum is taken at time t over all the possible paths (xt+i)i1. Let us dene the
operator Etpt+i which given the price level at t returns the lowest possible price at t + i. This can
be computed from equation (4) by assuming that the shock " is equal to its worst realization " in
every period between t and t + i
Etpt+i = p + (")i(pt   p) (6)
where p = [1   (1   ")=(1   ")]p is the lower bound to which pt converges if the shock is always






which, using (6), can be written as a linear function of the current price pt.
In order to reduce the number of state variables in the consumer's optimization problem with
hedging, it is useful to dene the country's \pledgeable wealth" as
wt  bt + xt + (pt):
This is the sum of the country's external wealth and of its pledgeable intertemporal export income
(the minimum present discounted value of export income that can be pledged in repayment to
foreigners). As can be seen using (3) and (5), period-t consumption must be lower than the
country's current non-export income plus its pledgeable wealth,
ct  1 + wt:








ct  1 + wt; (8)
wt+1 = R(1 + wt   (pt)   ct) + qpt+1 + (pt+1); (9)
pt+1 = (p + (pt   p))"t+1: (10)















We assume the impatience condition
(1 + r)
G < 1; (12)
which, as discussed in Christopher D. Carroll (2008) and Jeanne and Sandri (2009), prevents degen-
erate solutions with innite accumulation of foreign assets.10 We solve the problem numerically by
policy function iteration as explained in appendix C. The dynamics of wt are then obtained from
the intertemporal budget constraint (9) with ct = c(wt;pt). The dynamics of the net foreign asset
position bt are derived by netting out current export income xt and (pt). As discussed in detail
by Jeanne and Sandri (2009), the model features a target net foreign asset position, ^ b, towards
which the economy tends to converge over time.11 The target could be positive or negative. It is
increasing with the variance in export income and with the domestic consumer's patience.
We have not allowed the country to have both foreign assets and foreign liabilities at the same
time, but a simple extension of the model makes this possible. Let us assume that the country has
gross foreign assets B0
t and gross external debt Dt. Assets and liabilities bear the same interest
rate r. There is furthermore an external credit constraint Dt  Dt. It is generally assumed in the
literature that the maximum level of gross debt Dt is proportional to the level of domestic output
or of domestic collateral. The constraint involves gross debt because the foreign assets cannot be
pledged in repayment to foreign creditors (they are protected by sovereign immunity).
Under these assumptions, the model endogenizes the dierence Bt = B0
t   Dt but the levels of
10This condition is sucient if  < 1. A stronger restriction is required if  = 1.
11Formally the target is dened as the level of bt at which Etbt+1 = bt. For a formal proof of the existence of this
target see Carroll (2008).
10B0
t and Dt are indeterminate. If we assume that the external credit constraint is binding (Dt = Dt),
the model gives us a unique level of gross foreign assets B0
t. We can think of B0
t as a commodity
fund coexisting with external debt.
3.2 Futures
We now assume that export income can be hedged using futures or forward contracts.12 Futures





p + (pt   p)
1 + 
; (13)
where  is the premium on the future price, which could be positive because of investors' risk
aversion or a liquidity premium.
One can use the premium  to capture dierent assumptions about the availability of hedging
instruments. For example, the absence of hedging instruments corresponds to  = +1 for   1.
Hedging instruments whose liquidity decreases with the horizon can be modeled as an increasing
path for . Financial innovation can be dened as a reduction in  at certain horizons.
Determining the optimal hedging policy for an arbitrary cost structure ftgt=0;::;+1 is a com-
putationally demanding problem with a very large state and choice space.13 To simplify, we will
assume that hedging is costless up to horizon , and innitely costly at longer horizons:
t = 0 for t  ;
t = +1 for t > :
It follows that the consumer hedges all the export income  periods ahead. In the absence of risk
premium, the futures are priced at their actuarially fair value, so that a risk-averse representative
agent takes full advantage of them by hedging all his export income. Note that in this frictionless
12The dierence between futures and forward contracts is that the former are traded in an organized market. The
structure of the market does not matter for our results so that we will refer to the hedging instruments indierently
as futures or forward contracts.
13With positive nite risk premiums, we must solve for the share of production that the country wants to sell forward
at each available maturity, thus enlarging the choice set. The state space would become much larger due to the need
of keeping track of the share of production in each future year that has already been sold forward.
11setting the country could achieve full insurance by rolling over one-year forwards.14 However,
various costs associated with rolling over short-term contracts may limit the eectiveness of this
strategy in practice. Alternatively, we could allow for rolling over the hedge forward at no cost and
re-interpret  as the horizon of the hedging strategy rather than the maturity of the underlying
contracts.
The introduction of futures improves the welfare of the representative consumer through two
channels. The rst channel involves smoothing export income and consequently consumption. The
second, somewhat less obvious mechanism works through the country's \external balance sheet".
Regarding income smoothing, hedging allows the country to sell its commodity exports at the
conditional expected price  periods ahead, (p + (pt    p)). Income volatility, thus, is reduced
by the factor . The reduction in income and consumption volatility increases with the horizon
of hedging and decreases with the persistence of the price process. In particular, the volatility is
reduced to zero by hedging at any horizon   1 if there is no persistence in the price process
( = 0). The associated benets are conceptually similar to the welfare gains from eliminating the
business cycle, as measured by Robert E. Lucas (1987).
The balance-sheet benets of futures are twofold. First, decreasing the volatility of income
reduces the target level of net foreign assets, b b. The country can thus \save on precautionary
savings", and increase the present discounted value of domestic consumption without making any
sacrice in terms of consumption volatility. Second, the introduction of futures relaxes the external
borrowing constraint. This eect is theoretically more subtle than the other ones but|as we will
see|may have a larger impact on domestic welfare. We spend the rest of this section to explain it.
Let us assume that futures are introduced at time t (starting from a situation without hedging




















14Consider for example the case in which the country wants to secure at time t the price at t+2 of q commodity units.
If two-year futures are available, the country could lock export revenues of q(p+
2(pt  p)). The same result can be
obtained by using one-year futures. By selling one year forward q=R and q units at time t and t + 1 respectively,
the country would secure revenues of (q=R)(p + (pt   p)   pt+1)R + q(p + (pt+1   p)) at time t + 2, equal to
q(p + 
2(pt   p)).
12where the superscript f is used to identify variables with a dierent denition under futures. The
rst term is the present discounted value of the export income that is sold forward in t, whereas
the second term is the minimum present discounted value of the export income that will be sold
after period t + 1. Comparing (7) and (14) shows that hedging increases the country maximum
borrowing capacity (
f
t > t).15 Hedging allows the country to secure a higher minimum level
of export income, and so to issue more default-free debt. The minimum level of export income is
increased by hedging because the exports that are sold forward are valued at the expected price
rather than at the worst possible spot price that can be later obtained.16
The equilibrium can be solved for in the same way as in the model without hedging, as explained
in more detail in Appendix B. The introduction of hedging increases pledgeable wealth to
w
f
t = bt + xt + 
f
t: (15)
The transition equation for pledgeable wealth becomes,
w
f
t+1 = R(1 + w
f
t   ~ 
f
t   ct) + R qF(pt+1;) + ~ 
f
t+1: (16)
In each year pledgeable wealth increases by the present discounted value of the commodity export
 periods ahead sold forward R qF(pt+1;), rather than by current export valued at the more
volatile spot price qpt+1. The maximization problem is equivalent to the one under no hedging,
but with transition equation (16) for pledgeable wealth which at time t is newly dened according
to (15).
4 The welfare gains from hedging
In this section we calibrate the model (in particular the process for pt) using data on commodity
prices, study the welfare gains from hedging, and discuss the sensitivity of the results to the key
parameters. We conclude by reporting the welfare gains for some specic commodities.
15This results from the inequality Etpt+i  F(Etpt+i ;) for i  , which implies Etpt+i  F(pt;i) for i = . The
inequality directly follows from (6) and (13).
16The country's borrowing capacity is determined by the minimum level of export income because of the assumptions
that only export income is pledgeable and that debt is default-free. In section 5.2 we consider an extension of the
model with defaultable debt.
134.1 Calibration
Our benchmark calibration is reported in Table 3. The values of r, , and  are standard in the
literature. We choose a deterministic growth rate of 1 percent and will discuss the sensitivity to
this parameter in the next section.
Table 3: Benchmark calibration
r   G   qp
0:04 2 1:04 1 1:01 0:9 0:2 0:2
The persistency and volatility of price shocks are calibrated by reference to the time series
properties of commodity prices. We estimate the AR1 process with multiplicative error term in
equation (4) using annual commodity price data taken from the International Financial Statistics
and deated by the export unit value for industrial countries. We assume that the error term is
lognormally distributed with mean one and standard deviation , and perform the estimation using
Maximum Likelihood as described in Appendix D. The results are reported in Table 4 together
with the ratios of commodity exports to non-export GDP, qp, obtained as the simple average of
the data in Table 1.
Table 4: Calibration by commodity
Commodity   qp(%)
Aluminum 0.71 0.14 15.0
Cocoa 0.98 0.42 13.6
Copper 0.87 0.20 18.2
Fish 0.88 0.10 10.3
Gold 0.96 0.16 13.6
Iron 0.98 0.14 22.2
Natural Gas 0.97 0.27 21.4
Petroleum 0.98 0.21 38.0
Sugar 0.65 0.34 18.2
As documented in the literature (Paul Cashin, Hong Liang and C. John McDermott (2000)), we
nd that shocks to commodity prices are very persistent, with autocorrelation coecients usually
14above 0:85. Our benchmark value for the persistence parameter, 0:9, is somewhat higher than the
average level of  across commodities (0:86), but lower than the estimated persistence for oil, which
is the highest across all commodities in our sample and close to 1. We nd that the year-to-year
volatility in the price varies from 10 to 40 percent depending on the commodity: in the calibration
we choose  = 0:2, close to the cross-commodity average as well as the volatility of oil prices.
Finally, we set the ratio of commodity export to non-commodity GDP to 20 percent, close to the
average across commodities.
4.2 Benchmark results
By numerically solving the model, we nd that under the benchmark calibration the country's
target level of net foreign assets is equal to zero, ^ b = 0. In other terms, the country's gross foreign
assets fully cover its gross external debt. The impatience condition (12) is satised because of the
positive growth in domestic income, against which the domestic consumer would like to borrow.
Although impatience is generated by a relatively moderate growth rate in income (1 percent), the
borrowing motive is suciently strong to dominate the precautionary savings motive, so that the
country would like to be a net debtor. However, the country cannot be a net debtor because the
process (4) implies that future export income could fall to zero with a nonzero probability. In the
absence of hedging, thus, the country simply converges to a zero level of net foreign assets.
As common in the literature, we express the welfare gains from hedging in terms of the per-
manent percentage increase in annual consumption that yields the same welfare gain for the rep-
resentative consumer in the economy without hedging (at the target level of net foreign assets,
bt = ^ b and at the equilibrium price pt = p).17 More formally, by exploiting the homotheticity of
the CRRA utility function, the welfare gain from the introduction of hedging is dened as the f
which solves:
(1 + f)1 v(w(^ b;p);p) = vf(wf(^ b;p);p); (17)
17We could also obtain an unconditional measure of the welfare gain by taking the average of 
f over a large number









As already discussed in section 3.2, hedging improves welfare through two channels: rst, by
reducing the volatility of income; and second, by allowing the country to reduce its net foreign
asset position. In order to measure the welfare gain from the rst channel, we use the smoother
income process allowed by hedging but keep the same consumption function (and so the same target
level of assets) as in the absence of hedging. We are therefore exclusively assessing the gains from
reducing the income and consumption variance, without allowing for the optimal depletion of the
net foreign asset position.
Figure 2 shows the welfare gains from futures as a function of their maturity (the case where
the policy functions are held constant is denoted with an upper bar on the variable names). We
observe that 1-year forward contracts yield relatively small welfare gains, equivalent to a permanent
increase in annual consumption of less than one-tenth of a percent, similar to the benets from
eliminating the business cycle as quantied by Lucas (1987).18 Even extending the maturity to
twenty years provides the country with limited gains, less than one half of a percent.






Figure 2: Welfare gains from consumption smoothing only (holding constant the target level ^ b)
Figure 3 reports the welfare gains from futures contracts once we allow the country to optimally
adjust its net foreign asset position. The welfare gains are about ten times larger than in the
previous case. One-year forward contracts with endogenous net foreign asset position leads to
18Stephane Pallage and Michel A. Robe (2003) have found business cycle uctuations to be more costly in developing
countries than in advanced ones because their economies are more volatile.
16welfare gains equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of more than one percent. Forward
contracts with maturity of ve years multiply these gains by more than three. Furthermore, the
gains are marginally decreasing with the maturity, so that 10-year contracts provides most of the
benets.







Figure 3: Full welfare gains (allowing for the optimal reduction in bt)
The reason behind the much larger welfare gains from hedging with endogenous net foreign
assets is that the introduction of futures allows the country to boost consumption by consuming a
fraction of precautionary assets or by issuing debt. This can be seen from the left panel of Figure 4,
which shows the variations of the consumption function with the normalized net foreign assets, b.19
The curve labeled with  = 0 corresponds to the case without hedging, whereas the other curves
correspond to futures of maturities  equal to 1, 3 and 10 years and innity. We observe that the
introduction of futures boosts consumption, which is nanced by depleting the net foreign asset
position. The right-hand side panel shows how the target for net foreign assets decreases with the
maturity of hedging instruments, from a debt of about 80 percent of income for one-year contracts
to a debt amounting to ve years of income for twenty-year contracts.
The fact that the introduction of hedging leads to the reduction of foreign assets raises interest-
ing questions about the distribution of the welfare gains over time. Figure 5 shows, on the left-hand
side, the dynamics of the net foreign asset position in the absence of price shocks following the in-
troduction of futures with maturities of respectively one, ve and ten years. On the right-hand side,
we plot the change in consumption induced by hedging computed j years after the introduction of
futures.
19The consumption functions are solved in the (wt;pt) state space. Figure 4 shows the consumption function assuming























Figure 4: Consumption functions and target net foreign asset position
The impact of hedging on domestic consumption is positive over the rst ten years, but turn
negative after that due to the service of foreign debt. Consumption is reduced by more than 5
percent forty years after the introduction of 5-year forward contracts. This suggests that in an
overlapping-generations model, expanding the hedging possibilities would increase the welfare of


























Figure 5: Dynamics of net foreign assets and consumption following the introduction of hedging
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
Under the benchmark calibration, the model leads to three main results. First, the welfare gains
from forward contracts can be large. Second, most of the welfare gains come from the relaxation
of the borrowing constraint. Third, contracts with medium-term maturities already provide most
of the gains. We now discuss the sensitivity of these results to alternative parameter values.
20Indeed, our model can be interpreted as one with overlapping generations and perfectly altruistic (but impatient)
parents. It is perfectly equivalent to assume that individuals are innitely-lived or that they care about their osprings
as much as about themselves.
18We investigate rst the role of the intertemporal discount factor and of the growth rate, with
and without allowing for changes in foreign assets. These are important parameters since they alter
the consumer's level of impatience and thus his desire to borrow against future income. Figure 6
shows that as we reduce the discount rate by increasing the value of , the country targets a larger
net foreign asset position as a percentage of GDP. As  approaches G=R the impatience condition
(12) becomes an equality and the foreign asset target goes to innity.
Intuitively, a higher degree of patience should reduce the utility cost of holding precautionary
assets and so should also reduce the welfare gains from substituting those assets by hedging. The
top-right panel of Figure 6 conrms that this is indeed the case. The gure shows how the welfare
gains from hedging at an innite horizon vary with  under two assumptions: if the country does
not adjust its foreign assets target ( = +1) and if it does ( = +1). As  increases, the welfare
gains coming from the balance sheet channel, measured by the gap between the two curves, shrinks
and converges to zero as  comes close to its upper bound. This is so even though hedging reduces
the level of precautionary foreign assets by a very large amount when  is large. The large reduction
in foreign assets does not lead to large welfare gains because the consumer is patient and does not
suer much from postponing consumption. The main lesson from Figure 6 is that hedging yields
large welfare gains if the domestic consumer is impatient, and it does so by relaxing his external
borrowing constraint.
The bottom panels of Figure 6 show the variations of the target level of foreign assets and of the
welfare gains from hedging with the growth rate. Increasing the growth rate has the same eect as
decreasing patience since this makes the consumer more willing to borrow against future income.
Thus the welfare gains from relaxing the borrowing constraint increase with the growth rate.
We now consider the sensitivity of the results to the properties of the price process. The left-
hand side plot of Figure 7 shows that under the benchmark calibration, changing the persistence of
the price process, , does not aect the target level for foreign assets, which remains equal to zero.
The middle plot displays the welfare gains from moving to full insurance (i.e., with forward contracts
of innity maturity) respectively with and without allowing the country to borrow. We observe
that while the welfare gains from a smoother income are relative small, they become signicant if































Figure 6: Welfare gains as a function of discount factor and growth rate
of the price process increases with its persistence.



























Figure 7: Welfare gains as a function of the shock persistency, 
Finally, the right-hand side plot shows the fraction of the welfare gains from full insurance that
can be obtained with futures of nite maturities. The gure reveals that if the shocks are fully
transitory ( = 0), even a one-year forward contract is able to provide the country with complete
insurance. This is easily understood by considering that with transitory shocks the expectation of
tomorrow's price is always equal to its average. As the persistence of the shock increases, short-
horizon contracts yield a lower share of the maximum welfare gains. At very high persistence we
observe that even ten-year forward contracts provide the country with only around fty percent of
the welfare gains from full insurance.
The sensitivity of the welfare gains to the standard deviation of the shock in export income is
shown in Figure 8. In the absence of hedging, higher volatility leads to a larger stock of precaution-
ary savings. The welfare gains from moving to full insurance are also increasing with the volatility
20of the price innovation, and the gains from income smoothing become signicant for high levels of
income volatility. We also see that the welfare gains from increasing the horizon of hedging are not
sensitive to the level of income volatility.






























Figure 8: Welfare gains as a function of the shock variance, 
Summing up, the welfare gains from hedging export income may be much larger than the
welfare costs of the business cycle. This is because hedging does more than simply smoothing the
consumer's income: it also relaxes the country's external borrowing constraint, which yields a large
welfare gain if the consumer is impatient.
4.4 Welfare gains by commodities
Having quantied the welfare gains under our benchmark calibration and discussed their sensitivity,
we now calibrate the model using data on key commodities. Table 5 reports the welfare results,
computed using the parameters from Table 4. The rst two columns report the benets of full
insurance, respectively with and without adjustment of the target level for foreign assets. The
subsequent columns report the gains reaped with forward contracts of maturities of 1, 3, 5, 10 and
20 years.
We observe that the welfare gains from hedging are potentially very large, ranging from 3 percent
to more than 8 percent of consumption in the case of Petroleum. As discussed in section 4.3, the
benets are increasing with the persistence and variance of the price shocks and are obviously
greater for countries whose commodity export income accounts for a larger share of total GDP.
Countries exporting commodities with low shock persistence, such as Aluminium, obtain most of
the gains from hedging at relatively short maturities, while exporters of commodities subject to
more persistent shocks, like Petroleum, derive large welfare benets from extending the horizon of
hedging.
















Aluminum 3.8 0.0 1.7 3.0 3.4 3.8 3.8
Cocoa 6.3 2.5 0.5 1.3 2.0 3.3 4.8
Copper 4.5 0.3 1.2 2.5 3.2 4.0 4.4
Fish 3.1 0.0 0.7 1.5 2.0 2.6 3.0
Gold 3.9 0.2 0.5 1.2 1.7 2.5 3.3
Iron 5.4 0.7 0.5 1.2 1.8 2.8 4.0
Natural Gas 6.7 2.0 0.7 1.7 2.5 4.0 5.4
Petroleum 8.7 2.8 0.9 2.3 3.3 5.2 7.1
Sugar 4.5 0.3 2.4 3.8 4.2 4.5 4.5
5 Extensions
We present two extensions of the model. In the rst one, the insurance against the commodity price
risk is achieved through options rather than forward contracts. In the second extension, we allow
for defaultable debt and study its ability to act as an insurance mechanism when default occurs in
response to large negative shock prices.
5.1 Options
Forward contracts help the country to avoid negative shocks to commodity prices, but at the same
time prevent it from reaping the gains of positive uctuations. Governments can therefore be
reluctant to adopt this hedging strategy since strong political opposition can arise during periods
of increasing commodity prices. A more politically viable alternative may be to insure exclusively
against the downside risk by purchasing put options that pay o only if the price of the commodity
falls below the strike price. This section looks at the welfare gains from hedging price risk with
options of dierent maturities and with dierent strike prices.
Assume that options of maturity  are unexpectedly introduced at time t. The strike price
is constant and equal to a fraction  of the equilibrium price p. Consistent with our assumptions
about futures, we assume that options are sold at the fair risk-neutral price, so that the country
will buy enough options to fully cover its export income.
22At the time when options are introduced, the maximum amount of default free borrowing for
















R i [max(Etpt+i;p)   (Etpt+i)];
where we use superscript o to distinguish variables that refer to options, and i(pt) is the price
of an option with maturity i and strike price p when the export price is pt. The rst term
corresponds to the cost of the options purchased at time t. The second term reects the minimum
present value of future export income net of the cost of buying the options. We use the fact that
max(pt+i;p)   (pt+i) is increasing with pt+i and so is minimized for pt+i = Etpt+i.
The country's pledgeable wealth at the time of the introduction of options is thus given by:
wo




t+1 = R(1 + wo
t   ~ o
t   ct) + q [max(pt+1;p)   (pt+1)] + ~ o
t+1:
Using the same solution procedure as for futures and under the benchmark calibration in Table 3,
we compute the welfare gains from introducing options with dierent maturities and strike prices.21
The results are shown in Figure 9. The dotted lines correspond to the case of options with strike
prices at respectively 40, 60 and 80 percent of the average price. As shown by the left-hand side
panel, options allow the country to issue more default-free debt by limiting the downside risk in
export income. This benet is increasing with the strike price. The welfare gains from options are
increasing with their horizon and with the strike price.
For comparison, the continuous line reports the results with futures. Futures dominate options
because they hedge the risk on both sides.22 However for maturities shorter than ve years, most of
the welfare gains from futures can be captured by options, including relatively inexpensive options
21The option price (pt) is computed numerically using Monte Carlo simulations.
22The options become equivalent to futures as the strike price goes to innity.
23with low strike prices. This is no longer the case at longer maturities, for which high strike prices


























Figure 9: Net foreign assets and welfare gains with options and futures contracts
5.2 Default
Defaultable debt may reduce the welfare gains from hedging in two ways. First, default itself
may be viewed as a substitute to hedging if it tends to occur when the price of the commodity
export is low.23 Second, allowing the country to default will relax the no-default constraint and
allow impatient countries to issue more debt|which was an important benet from hedging. Since
default occurs in the real world, it seems important to see the extent to which defaultable debt
provides a substitute for hedging.
More formally, we assume that the country defaults entirely on its foreign debt if the export
price falls below a certain percentage threshold of the equilibrium price, p. There is no repayment
following a default (the debt is completely erased). We assume that defaulting is costless: this
entails no loss of output, the country maintains access to international debt market and foreigners
are willing to purchase defaultable debt without requiring a pure risk premium compensating for
risk aversion (although there is a default risk premium compensating for the probability of default).
These assumptions obviously bias the analysis in favor of default, so that the following estimates
should be viewed as an upper bound for the welfare gains from defaultable debt.
Dening t;i as the default probability i periods ahead from time t, the equilibrium gross interest
23The country could insure itself perfectly by issuing liabilities that are contingent on the commodity price. There is a
line of literature on sovereign debt that views default as a way of approximating the optimal state contingency (see,
e.g., Herschel Grossman and John Van Huyck (1988).





Since default is assumed to happen only if the price falls below p, the country is still subject
to the \natural" constraint of limiting the amount of borrowing to what it can repay in the worst
possible scenario. The worst possible outcome for the country in the presence of default, is the one
in which the export price drops permanently to exactly p, which leads to the minimum present











where the subscript d denotes the variables if debt is defaultable.
Let us assume that debt becomes defaultable at some time t. The country's pledgeable wealth
is now given by,
wd
t = bt + xt + d
t;




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
atR=(1   t;1) + qpt+1 + d
t+1 if at < 0 and pt+1  p;
qpt+1 + d
t+1 if at < 0 and pt+1 < p;
atR + qpt+1 + d
t+1 if at > 0;
(19)
where at = 1+wd
t  ct d
t is the net foreign asset position at the end of period t after consumption
occurs.
As in the case of options and futures, the welfare gains from defaultable debt are closely related
to the relaxation of the borrowing constraint. A higher default threshold  increases the level of
export income the country can borrow against p, but also the probability of default and conse-
quently the default risk premium. The impact of the default threshold on the borrowing ability of
the country is therefore non monotonic as shown in Figure 10. We see that the maximum borrow-
ing potential is achieved at a low levels of , around 30 percent, and so are the maximum welfare
25gains, which can reach almost 2 percent of consumption. Somewhat unexpectedly, the possibility
of default leads to the highest benets when its occurrence is limited to very low prices. In this






















Figure 10: Borrowing capacity, equilibrium net foreign assets and welfare gains with defaultable
debt
Defaultable debt is a form of insurance and yields some welfare gains. However, it is dominated
by a combination of non-defaultable debt and hedging (provided that hedging instruments are
available at a suciently long horizon). This is so even though we made the unrealistic assumption
that default did not involve any cost in terms of output or credibility. Such costs would reduce
further the net value of defaultable debt as a form of insurance.
6 Conclusion
Many developing countries receive a large share of their national income by exporting a single
commodity. These countries are severely exposed to the uctuations in commodity prices which
tend to be very volatile and persistent. In this paper we developed a small open economy model in
order to investigate the welfare gains that hedging strategies can provide to commodity exporters.
The availability of insurance instruments leads to two sources of gains. First, it reduces the
export income volatility, allowing for a smoother consumption path. Second, it allows the country
to reduce its net foreign assets, and to issue more default-free debt against future export income
(the balance sheet channel).
Under our benchmark calibration, the introduction of forward contracts with ten-year maturity
24These results, however, clearly depend on the parameters of the model and in particular on the impatience factor.
With a lower discount factor or growth rate, the country's desire to borrow against future income decreases and the
relative importance of reducing the volatility of income increases. Therefore, a higher  with more frequent default
becomes more appealing.
26can lead to substantial welfare gains, equivalent to a four percent permanent increase in consump-
tion. Most of the benets come from the balance sheet channel, and depend on the country's
degree of \impatience", i.e., its propensity to borrow against future export income. A country
with a low intertemporal discount factor does not make a large sacrice by maintaining a large
stock of precautionary savings. Hedging is much more benecial for fast-growing emerging market
economies that are willing to borrow against higher future income. Those welfare gains come from
a debt-nanced consumption boom that lasts about a decade and is followed by relatively lower
consumption to repay the debt. Finally, we have shown that options can be a valid substitute to
futures, while defaultable external debt is a less ecient form of insurance even if one leaves aside
the default costs.
Regarding future research, it would be interesting to endogenize investment in the model. In this
paper we have focused exclusively on the gains from smoothing consumption. However, hedging is
likely to increase welfare also by reducing the uncertainty in investment in the commodity sector, if
this leads to an expansion of productive capacity. Another useful extension of the model would be
to consider the dependence of government scal revenues on commodity exports. In the countries
where scal revenues are sensitive to commodity prices, hedging may lead to additional gains that
are not captured by our model. More generally, the type of models that we use in this paper can
be used to quantify the benets of hedging against other country risks such as natural disasters or
sudden stops in capital ows.
27Appendix
A Commodity Price Data
Table 6: Commodity price data from International Finance Statistics
Commodity IFS name price data coverage
Aluminum Aluminum: Canada 1957   2007
Cocoa Cocoa beans: Ghana 1955   2007
Copper Copper: United Kingdom 1957   2007
Fish Fish: Norway 1980   2007
Gold Gold: United Kingdom 1963   2007
Iron Iron Ore: Brazil 1955   2007
Natural Gas Natural Gas: Russian Federation 1985   2007
Petroleum Petroleum West Texas Intermediate 1959   2007
B Model with hedging
Pledgeable wealth is given by
w
f
t = bt + xt + 
f
t ;
where pledgeable future export income can be decomposed in two terms, the export income that
has already been sold forward, ^ 
f
t , and the minimum value of the export income that will be sold





t = ^ 
f
t + ~ 
f
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28The expressions for xt and ^ t depend on whether the futures were introduced more or less than 
periods before. When the futures are introduced (t = t), we have xt = qpt and ^ t is given by
the rst term on the r.h.s. of equation (14).
For t = t +1;:::;t +  1, the current export income has been sold forward at time t so that











For t   the economy enters the regime in which the export income has been sold forward 







In all cases we have
^ 
f
t+1 = R^ 
f
t   xt+1 + R qF(pt+1;):
Using this equation and the budget constraint (3) it is then easy to prove (16).
C Notes on numerical solution
The model is solved with policy function backward iteration over the state space (wt;xt), following
the endogenous gridpoints method proposed by Christopher D. Carroll (2006). We discretize the
end-of-period savings (1+wt ct t) over the interval [0;350], and xt over [0;10x] using respectively
50 and 20 points with a triple exponential growth. Policy functions over the entire state space are
constructed with linear interpolation. To limit the interpolation error for the value function, we
interpolate its transformation ((1   )vt)(1=(1 )). The grid to test for convergence is constructed
with 10 values for wt and 10 for xt, drawn with triple exponential growth respectively between
[0;30] and [0;5x]. The price shock "t+1 is discretized using 7 equally likely bins with the addition
of a zero realization with one out of a million probability mass. We have also experimented using
Gauss-Hermite quadrature instead of equally likely bins and obtained very similar results.
The welfare gains using the consumption function solved under no hedging in Figure 2 have been
29computed with 10;000 Monte Carlo simulations of income and consumption over 250 years. Monte
Carlo simulations have also been used to compute option prices and default probabilities, simulating
1;000;000 income patterns starting from 40 dierent values for xt drawn from the interval [0;20x]
with triple exponential growth rate.
D Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Consider the price process:
pt =
t z }| {
(p + (pt 1   p))"t (20)
where "t is lognormally distributed with mean 1 and variance 2. By taking logs (identied with a
tilde), the price process can be rewritten as:
~ pt = ~ t + ~ "t (21)
~ t = ln(p + (pt 1   p)) (22)
so that
~ ptjIt 1  N(~ t   2=2;2) (23)
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